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BACKGROUND
Physicians, scientists, patients, and the public rely on
professional organizations to provide an independent, un-
biased forum for presentation of research, publications, and
educational activities at their scientific sessions and in
scientific publications. Attendees at educational activities
sponsored by not-for-profit organizations usually incur fi-
nancial and other costs. The attendees expect to gain
information from leading experts that may modify their
behavior and result in a change in patient care. Concerns
about real or perceived conflicts of interest among organi-
zations, physicians, scientists, patients, and educators re-
garding their relationships with the medical products indus-
try have been debated in the press and in medical journals
(1,2). Concerns about these relationships have been dis-
cussed extensively by the Association of American Medical
Colleges (AAMC), which issued guidelines for conflict of
interest in human subjects’ research based on a consensus of
a committee including clinicians, scientists, legislators, eth-
icists, consumers, and representatives from commercial in-
terests (3).
The Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Ed-
ucation (ACCME), which accredits continuing medical
education (CME) provider organizations, currently requires
full disclosure of pertinent commercial relationships. The
ACCME has revised the Standards for Commercial Sup-
port which were adopted on April 1, 2004. Both the
American College of Cardiology Foundation (ACCF) and
the American Heart Association (AHA) policies must be in
compliance to maintain their accreditation (Table 1).
“Disclosure” must never include the use of a trade name
or a product-group message. A provider must disclose this
information to learners before beginning the educational
activity. The ACCME standards allow for relationships to
be disclosed verbally, and for a representative of the CME
provider who was in attendance to attest in writing that
verbal disclosure did occur.
Medical societies have struggled to define a significant
financial relationship that poses a real or perceived conflict
of interest. The American Society of Clinical Oncology
recently amended its regulations to encompass any money
exceeding $100 an investigator received from a firm funding
a trial (5). One criticism of this regulation is that the
threshold for disclosure is so low that the large number of
disclosures might obscure more serious financial relation-
ships. The New England Journal of Medicine has maintained
that authors of reviews and editorials must not have any
financial interest in a company or its competitor that makes
a product discussed in the article. Journal editors relaxed the
policy for reviewers in June 2002 because their ability to
recruit individuals for review articles and editorials was
constrained (6). The new policy prohibits a “significant”
financial interest, which the journal defined as a lower limit
of $10,000 in accordance with guidelines developed by the
National Institutes of Health (7) and the AAMC (3).
The concerns of consumers and professional organiza-
tions over conflicts of interest in medical research challenge
the ACCF and the AHA to review their policies on conflict
of interest, acknowledgment of commercial support, and
disclosure of financial relationships with the medical prod-
1736 Jacobs et al. JACC Vol. 44, No. 8, 2004
Task Force 3: Disclosure of Relationships: Policy for Educational Activities and Publications October 19, 2004:1736–40
ucts industry. The integrity of the ACCF, the AHA, and
cardiovascular subspecialty societies as well as their commit-
ment to truth and evidence-based, unbiased scientific in-
quiry, provides the foundation upon which their missions
depend. This fundamental tenet is critical to the validity and
success of the various organizations’ annual scientific ses-
sions, regional educational meetings, publications, and clin-
ical guidelines.
THE DISCLOSURE POLICY
Introduction. Participants in this Consensus Conference
cannot make policy for the ACCF and the AHA. However,
we can offer the following for consideration by those
organizations with hope they will adopt a uniform policy
addressing these issues. The following is meant to demon-
strate the ACCF’s and AHA’s high ethical standards and
scientific integrity, and to convey a commitment to ethical
behavior.
Policy statement. Audiences for any of the ACCF and the
AHA programs, products, policies, services, and scientific
publications are to be informed, prior to their participation,
of relevant relationships with commercial interests with any
proprietary entity producing health care goods or services
(with the exception of non-profit or government organiza-
tions and non-health care-related companies) on the part of
the ACCF and the AHA as organizations and by individual
ACCF and AHA contributors (including directors, plan-
ners, reviewers, moderators, speakers, faculty, and authors of
programs, products, services, and publications). The policy
should apply to authors of book chapters and editors of
journals. Members of the ACCF and the AHA are expected
to adhere to these policies when they participate in “satellite
sessions” around the time of local or national scientific
sessions and that are not sponsored or endorsed by the
ACCF and the AHA.
These policies also should apply to members who partic-
ipate in other educational activities such as live case dem-
onstrations, which may serve to disseminate knowledge,
management strategies, or advances in technology, but they
should not be used primarily to promote a product. The use
of the demonstrated technology always should be put in
proper clinical perspective. The provision of money by a
commercial interest to support a demonstration course must
not influence the content of the program.
Finally, it is the current policy of the ACCF and the
AHA to comply with the following:
1. The American Medical Association’s (AMA) Opinion
8.061, “Gifts to Physicians From Industry” (adopted
December 1990) (8) and Opinion 9.011, “Ethical Issues
on CME” (adopted by the AMA in December 1993
and updated June 1996) (9).
2. The ACCME’s “Standards for Commercial Support”
(10).
3. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Educa-
tion’s (ACGME) “Principles to Guide the Relationship
Between Graduate Medical Education and Industry” (11).
Individual financial relationships to disclose. The fol-
lowing relevant relationships with commercial interests with
any proprietary entity producing health care goods or
services (with the exception of non-profit or government
organizations and non-health care-related companies) sup-
porting a program, product, service, or document, including
financial interest for individual contributors (and his or her
spouse and dependent children) or for any foundation or
entity controlled or directed by the individual or his or her
spouse, must be disclosed before an individual contributor’s
participation in an ACCF or an AHA activity. The levels
recommended in this document were influenced by policies
previously established by the National Institutes of Health
(7) and by the Food and Drug Administration (12).
The Consensus Conference recommends that relevant
relationships be defined in terms of levels and nature of
support. The levels are as follows:
● None
● Modest: less than or equal to $10,000
● Significant: greater than $10,000
The categories of support are defined as follows:
Personal Income/Investments*
1. Consulting fees, honoraria (including honoraria from a
third party, if the original source is a financially
interested company), gifts or other emoluments, or “in
kind” compensation from a financially interested com-
pany (or entitlement to the same), whether for con-
sulting, lecturing, travel, service on an advisory board,
Table 1. Minimum Requirements for Compliance With
ACCME’s Standards for Commercial Support: Standards to
Ensure the Independence of CME Activities
● CME providers must be able to show that every person in a position
to control the content of an educational activity has disclosed all
relevant financial relationships with any commercial interest to the
provider. The ACCME defines “relevant relationships” as financial
relationships in any amount occurring within the past 12 months that
create a conflict of interest.
● An individual who refuses to disclose relevant financial relationships
will be disqualified from being a planning committee member, a
teacher, or an author of CME, and cannot have control of, or
responsibility for the development, management, presentation, or
evaluation of the CME activity.
● The CME provider must have implemented a mechanism to identify
and resolve all conflicts of interest prior to the education activity
being delivered to learners. When an individual discloses to learners
any relevant financial relationship(s), the information must include:
a) The name of the individual
b) The name of the commercial interest(s)
c) The nature of the relationship the person has with each
commercial interest
● The source of all support from commercial interest must be disclosed
to learners.
● When commercial support is “in-kind,” the nature of the support
must also be disclosed to learners.
Source: Excerpt from Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education,
Standards to Ensure the Independence of CME Activities (4).
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legal testimony or consultation, or for any other similar
purpose in the prior calendar year.
2. Equity interests (or entitlement to the same), including
stock options, of any amount in a non-publicly traded
and financially related company.
3. Equity interests (or entitlement to the same) in a
publicly traded and financially related company (see
the exceptions in the following text).
4. Royalty income or the right to receive future royalties
under a patent license or copyright, where the topic is
directly related to the licensed technology or work
under discussion.
5. Any non-royalty payments or entitlements to pay-
ments in connection with the activity that are not
directly related to the reasonable costs of that activity.
6. Service as an officer, director, or in any other fiduciary
role for a financially interested company, whether or
not remuneration is received for such service.
7. Sole ownership, partnership, or principal of an
enterprise.
*Exceptions: interests of any amount in financially inter-
ested company(ies) by virtue of ownership of publicly
traded, diversified mutual funds.
Programmatic Support
8. Research grants from a financially interested company.
9. Fellowship support.
10. Funding of a salary or position (partial or full) or
“in-kind” support of the program.
A potential conflict of interest level should reflect a
cumulative value of personal income/investments and pro-
grammatic support. All royalties or stock options should be
acknowledged because their value could become significant,
and having such arrangements implies a vested interest in
the future of the related commercial interest. Full disclosure
of relationships with commercial interests should be avail-
able to the learner prior to the activity. The speaker must
acknowledge whether specific categories and the cumulative
value of relationships is none, modest (less than or equal to
$10,000), or significant (greater than $10,000). The name(s)
of the commercial interest(s) must be printed in the syllabus
and should be presented verbally or visually on a slide at the
time of presentation. The introductory slides should include
the information in Table 2.
Both the ACCF and the AHA should develop a uniform
secure database, updated yearly, containing full disclosure of
relationships with commercial interests for individuals (in-
cluding planners and reviewers of programs and publica-
tions) participating in ACCF and AHA educational activ-
ities, products, policies, services, and scientific publications.
Disclosure of Financial Relationships to Audiences
The need to disclose specific financial involvement only
applies if it is germane to the content of the CME activity
or related to commercial supporters of the educational
activity. All audiences and readers will be informed, prior to
or as an integral part of the activity, whether the contribu-
tor: 1) has no individual relationships to disclose as previ-
ously described, or 2) has individual relationships to disclose
as previously described. It is incumbent on the speaker to
provide full disclosure of germane relationships to commer-
cial interests. It is the responsibility of the moderator to
request this information at the time of presentation if it has
not been provided. Non-compliance, which includes willful
refusal or incomplete disclosure, should prohibit future
participation by that individual in ACCF and AHA activities.
The ACCF and AHA organizational financial relation-
ships to disclose should be acknowledged before or as an
integral part of the activity by indicating the corporate name
of the supporter and the level of financial support as
previously defined.
MECHANISMS FOR DISCLOSURE
Participants in educational activities. The content or
format of a CME activity or its related materials must
promote improvements or quality in health care and not
specific proprietary business or commercial interests. Pre-
sentations must offer a balanced view of therapeutic options.
Use of generic names will contribute to impartiality. If the
CME educational material or content includes trade names,
where available, trade names of products from several
companies should be used, not just trade names from a
single company. The program syllabus and/or a slide should
disclose relationships with commercial interests to identify a
potential conflict of interest of both planners and reviewers.
Authors of editorials and original articles. The ACCF
and AHA journal editors should obtain information regard-
ing relationships with industry at the time of submission of
an original manuscript and before inviting an editorial
submission from an expert. When feasible, an additional
expert opinion may be sought from another peer without a
potential conflict of interest. Transparency concerning po-
tential conflict of interest for authors of original publications
and editorialists is sufficiently important to warrant a more
in-depth statement specifying the nature and magnitude of
the relevant relationship with a commercial entity. The
information disclosed should include: 1) the name of the
individual, 2) the name of the company/enterprise, 3) the
nature of the contract with industry (e.g., data handling,
statistics, censorship of results, ability to report adverse
findings), and 4) the level of financial support.






Personal Income/Investments Specify Level Specify
Royalties/Stock Options Yes or No Specify
Programmatic Support Specify Level Specify
Cumulative/Total Support Specify Level Specify
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Members of the writing groups of the ACCF and the
AHA scientific statements and practice guidelines. The
potential conflict of interest of the writing group should be
provided in detail. The ACC/AHA Task Force on Practice
Guidelines developed a policy for the guideline process that
incorporates several unique elements (8). The Consensus
Conference endorses this approach. Each writing commit-
tee member is required to make full oral disclosure at the
initial writing committee meeting of any potential conflict
of interest. At each subsequent meeting, a written summary
of disclosure is provided to the entire committee, and each
member is asked to update his or her information regarding
any new potential conflict of interest. Full disclosure is
thought to be critical to the credibility of the process, and it
is carefully monitored by the Task Force. Those members of
the writing committee who have disclosed a relationship
with industry are invited to supply information on the topic
for which they provided a disclosed relationship, but they
are excused from the room for the vote on guideline
recommendations pertaining to the disclosed conflict. In-
formation on relationships with commercial interests for
each writing group member and peer reviewer of a practice
guideline is published with the document. Finally, members
of the writing committee are prohibited from sharing
information pertinent to the writing effort with commercial
interests until the document has been posted on the ACC
and/or AHA web sites.
CONSEQUENCES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
Personal and professional. Consequences for refusal or
failure to disclose a relationship with industry or to be
willfully out of compliance with the ACCF and the AHA
policies need to be substantial enough to ensure the integrity
of the policies. The policies and potential sanctions should
be fully disclosed to all participants in educational activities,
products and services, and publications. The ACC/ACCF
Ethics and Discipline Committee and the AHA Conflict of
Interest Review Committee should be responsible for ad-
ministering and enforcing appropriate sanctions. The
ACCF and the AHA should create a mechanism to
randomly audit disclosures and to create a process where
ACCF and AHA members and attendees of educational
activities can report potential violations, including partial
disclosure or non-disclosure, for further investigation.
Refusal by an individual to provide adequate disclosure
consistent with the conflict of interest policy should prohibit
participation by that individual in ACCF and AHA activ-
ities. As a further safeguard, violations may also be reported
to the individual’s academic institution or entity with whom
he or she is professionally affiliated.
A mechanism should be established for disqualification of
individuals with a conflict of interest that cannot be ade-
quately dispelled with disclosure. Such matters might be
placed under the jurisdiction of the ACC/ACCF Ethics
and Discipline Committee and the AHA Conflict of
Interest Review Committee.
Potential legal risks. The Office of the Inspector General of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
has published a Compliance Program Guidance (13) relevant
to this subject. Because HHS is responsible for proper use of
Medicare and other government programs, it is vigilant to
prevent improper use of the program funds. The Guidance
speaks to support provided by pharmaceutical manufacturers in
Section B: “Key Areas of Potential Risk.” With regard to
educational grants, the Guidance addresses the issue that, to
the extent the medical product manufacturer has any influence
over the substance of an educational program or the speaker,
there is a risk that the educational program may be used for
inappropriate marketing purposes.
To reduce the risks that a program supported by a grant
is used improperly to induce or reward product purchases or
to market products inappropriately, manufacturers are ad-
vised to separate their grant-making function from the sales
and marketing function. Effective separation of these func-
tions should help ensure that grant funding is not inappro-
priately influenced by sales or marketing motivations and
that the educational purposes of the grant are legitimate.
With regard to research funding, the Guidance advises clear
separation of research contracts from marketing.
The HHS Guidance also states that manufacturers,
providers, and suppliers of health care products and services
frequently cultivate relationships with physicians in a posi-
tion to generate business for them through a variety of
practices, including gifts, entertainment, and personal ser-
vices compensation arrangements. The activities have a
potential for fraud and abuse and, historically, have gener-
ated a substantial number of anti-kickback convictions (see
the Task Force 4 report). The Guidance speaks to consult-
ing and advisory payments and conveys concern about
compensation relationships with physicians for services
connected directly or indirectly to a manufacturer’s market-
ing sales activities, such as speaking, certain research, or
preceptor or “shadowing” services. These may pose a risk of
fraud and abuse. It is important to note that the Guidance
is advisory in intent; nonetheless, it does have the legal
authority of federal anti-kickback statute, which poses risk
of prosecution by the U.S. Attorney General’s office.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Consensus Conference believes the policies proposed
herein would represent the ACCF, the AHA, and cardio-
vascular subspecialty societies’ commitment and dedication
to the highest levels of professionalism and ethical behavior
in educational activities and publications. Therefore, the Con-
sensus Conference proposes the following recommendations:
1. Disclosure of financial relationships with commercial in-
terests should be mandatory for educational activities and
publications (original articles, policy statements, editorials,
texts, and guidelines). The policy and disclosure guidance
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discussed in this document should be adopted by the
ACCF, the AHA, and cardiovascular subspecialty societies
using as uniform a mechanism as possible.
2. The ACCF, the AHA, and cardiovascular subspecialty
societies should develop a secure uniform database
containing full disclosure of relationships with commer-
cial interests for individuals (including planners and
reviewers of programs and publications) participating in
ACCF and AHA educational activities, products, pol-
icies, services, and scientific publications. The database
should be updated yearly.
3. The ACCF, the AHA, and cardiovascular subspecialty
societies should educate their members and promote
compliance with: the AMA’s policy on “Gifts to Physi-
cians from Industry” (8); the ACCME’s “Standards for
Commercial Support” (10); and the ACGME’s “Princi-
ples to Guide the Relationship Between Graduate Medical
Education and Industry” (11).
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INTRODUCTION
“Professionalism is the basis of medicine’s contract with
society. It demands placing the interests of patients above
those of the physician, setting and maintaining standards of
competence and integrity, and providing expert advice to
society on matters of health . . . . Essential to this contract is
public trust in physicians, which depends on the integrity of
both individual physicians and the whole profession” (1).
Cardiovascular specialists support the fundamental princi-
ples of primacy of patient welfare, patient autonomy, and
the promotion of social justice.
For the purposes of this document, “self-referral” occurs
when a physician recommends a patient intervention from
which the physician may benefit personally. Such recom-
mendations usually facilitate the provision of efficient,
effective, and high-quality care, but may also afford the
potential for abuse. As former JACC Editor-in-Chief
William Parmley stated so clearly: “At issue is the question
of intent; if the intent is to provide excellent medical care,
the practice is laudable. If the intent is to subjugate medical
decision-making, then the practice is unethical” (2). Those
few physicians who are publicized for violating our trust do
not reflect the rank and file of cardiovascular specialists.
The cardiovascular specialist’s primary duty is to the
patient. His or her role is to promote patient welfare in an
increasingly complex health care environment, one that has
been made even more complex by the anti-kickback statutes
and Stark laws (see the following sections). Having entered
into a physician-patient relationship, physicians must coun-
sel their patients regardless of individual financial or medical
care delivery system considerations or other factors, such as
socio-economic status, race, gender, or sexual orientation
(3). The physician’s clinical judgment must not be influ-
enced by financial incentives from a fee-for-service system
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